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Choice of Law in National Class
Actions: Should CAFA Make A
Difference?
Linda J. Silberman*
Choice of law issues often have taken a back seat to other
important issues in civil litigation. But new attention to choice of
law has emerged in the context of class action litigation where
applicable law often becomes central to the critical question of
certification of a class. 1 In particular, choice of law analysis has
gained new prominence because attempts to structure nationwide
classes involving state law claims, such as damage actions for
consumer fraud or misrepresentation, overcharges in contract and
insurance cases, personal injury and breach of warranty claims for
defective products, punitive damages classes, and claims for
medical monitoring often turn on whether a single law or multiple
laws are to be applied.
Prior to the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA) in 2005, both the state and federal courts dealt with the
question of applicable law as a matter of state conflicts law, the
federal courts being required to do so under the Klaxon rule. 2
Thus, the development of choice of law rules for class actions was
* Linda J. Silberman, Martin Lipton Professor of Law, New York University
School of Law. The Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research
Fund has provided continuing financial support for this and other class
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1. For an extensive discussion of these developments, see Linda
Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 2001, 2007-21 (2008).
2. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). The
Supreme Court held in Klaxon that a federal court must apply the choice of
law rules of the state in which it sits.
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in the hands of the states. Favorable choice of law approaches as
well as more liberal certification practices in certain states led to
interstate forum shopping as a means to achieve certification of a
nationwide class. 3 CAFA was enacted to put an end to such
blatant forum shopping, and thus requests for certification of
nationwide classes most likely will now be heard by federal courts.
How restrictive the federal courts will be on certification is
unclear, and whether choice of law will have a significant impact
on their decisions is still an open question. In this Comment, I
suggest that state choice of law rules need not be followed in
actions covered by CAFA and that a federal choice of law rule is
appropriate. However, the substance of the applicable choice of
law rule or rules under CAFA should be the same as that which
would be applied to the claims of the various class members had
they brought their own individual actions. In short, aggregation
should not change the underlying substantive rights of the
parties. In developing these points, I first explain why interstate
forum shopping for choice of law has been so important in the
class action context. I then turn to the normative question as to
whether special choice of law rules should be developed for
aggregate litigation-in particular, class actions. Finally, I
consider whether the recent enactment of CAFA calls for
development of an independent federal choice of law rule, and if
so, what that rule should be.
A. THE PROBLEM OF INTERSTATE FORUM SHOPPING
Interstate forum-shopping in class action litigation has
occurred for various reasons-most notably a group of "magnet"
state courts that became attractive to plaintiffs' lawyers because
of the ease of obtaining certification of a nationwide class. 4 It was
3. For more detail on these issues, see my paper on the role of choice of
law in national class actions published in the recent University of
Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium on the Class Action Fairness Act,
Silberman, supra note 1, at 2001. See also 151 CONG. REC. S1228 (daily ed.
Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Other times, these duplicative
actions are the product of forum shopping by the original lawyers who file
similar actions in different State courts around the country, perhaps with the
sole purpose of finding a friendly judge willing to certify the class.").
4. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 22 (2005) ("A fourth type of class action
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in part for that reason that Congress enacted CAFA, authorizing
certain nationwide class actions to be brought in and/or removed
to federal court.5 In brief, the jurisdictional provisions of CAFA
provide for both original and removal jurisdiction in federal court
for class claims based on state law whenever there is minimal
diversity between any plaintiff class member and any defendant. 6
Class members are permitted to aggregate their claims to reach
the jurisdictional amount of more than five million dollars,7 and
any defendant has the right to remove the action from state to
federal court.8 However, the district court must decline to hear
the action if (a) greater than two-thirds of the members of the
proposed plaintiff class are citizens of the same state as one
significant defendant when the action is filed in that state and the
principal injuries occur there;9 or (b) greater than two-thirds of
the putative class and the primary defendants are all citizens of
the State in which the action was filed.' 0 There is also discretion
to decline jurisdiction in other limited circumstances. 11
The premise underlying CAFA is that the federal courts will
be less biased and parochial than the state courts have been with
abuse that is prevalent in state courts in some localities is the 'I never met a
class action I didn't like' approach to class certification."). Indeed, there was
some perception that "cozy relationships" existed between judges and the
plaintiffs' bar where judges are elected, given that the judges are dependent
upon financial support for their re-election. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1180
(daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (citing notorious plaintiff
lawyer Dickie Scruggs's discussion of "magic jurisdictions").
5. For recent discussions of the Act, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008); Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA's Stated
Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (2008).
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1453(b) (2006).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(6).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). A court may decline to exercise
jurisdiction in which greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of all
proposed plaintiff class members in the aggregate and the primary
defendants are citizens of the state in which the action was filed based on
such considerations including whether the claims involve matters of national
interest, whether the class will be governed by the law of the forum, whether
the pleading has been strategic to avoid federal jurisdiction, whether there is
a nexus with the forum, the citizenship of members of the plaintiff class, and
whether other class actions asserting similar claims have been filed.
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respect to the certification of "nationwide" classes. However, on
the question of the law to be applied to the class claims, CAFA is
silent. That is curious because choice of law had become
increasingly relevant to certification of nationwide classes prior to
CAFA. Plaintiffs who seek to have a nationwide class certified
under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) (or its state counterpart) must
minimize individual issues in order to satisfy the "predominance"
and "superiority" requirements for class certification 12 and to
counter problems of manageability that can come with the
application of multiple laws. 13 Plaintiffs therefore try to establish
either that (1) the law on a particular question is uniform
throughout the states of the United States-thereby showing that
common issues of law predominate-or that the applicable choice
of law rule leads to the application of a single law. Defendants, for
their part, strive to establish that there are substantial differences
among various state laws on particular issues, such as breach of
warranty, fraud, consumer fraud statutes, and the like-and that
the appropriate choice of law rule in the forum state results in the
application of the laws of many states. Unlike an individual
litigation, where plaintiff usually will argue for the law that offers
the greatest recovery and defendant will urge application of the
more restrictive rule, in class action litigation, the substance of
the applicable rule means little to either side. Plaintiffs press for
a single law to apply-such as the principal place of business of
the defendant-even if that law offers a lower standard of
recovery than would be provided under the competing rules.
Ordinarily, this proposition would lead to objections that such a
12. In addition to the general requirements for class actions under
Federal Rule 23(a) -- numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation -- class actions falling within Rule 23(b)(3) must meet
additional criteria. Those requirements are that common questions
predominate over individual issues and that a class action is "superior" to
other methods of adjudication.
13. One of the important factors in making the "superiority"
determination is the difficulty likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). In many instances, courts faced
with the application of multiple laws have found a class action to be
"unmanageable." See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012,
1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that where claims are to be adjudicated under
the laws of the fifty states and multiple territories, "a single nationwide class
is not manageable").
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choice of law rule leads to a "race to the bottom" such that
defendants would locate in "low consumer protection" states, but
in this context the main objective for plaintiffs is to have a single
law apply to defeat predominance and manageability concerns.
Defendants, on the other hand, press for more generous liability
rules that may exist in the home states of some members of the
plaintiff class-all in the service of having multiple laws apply
and subsequently arguing that the class cannot be certified.
Prior to CAFA, when the certification issue often came before
state courts, choice of law became an important element of the
decision of whether or not to certify a class. Federal courts under
Klaxon were obligated to apply the choice of law rules of the state
in which they sat, which significantly affected the federal court's
decision as to whether to certify. Under both state and federal
class action practice, in many instances certification only could
result if the court reached a "favorable" choice of law outcome-
i.e., that a single law was to be applied. Because there is no
uniformity with respect to choice of law approaches, plaintiffs
would seek a forum for a nationwide class action that had a choice
of law approach likely to lead to the application of a single law.
Although Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts held a forum state's
interest in "adjudicating a nationwide class action" did not
alleviate the constitutional requirement that in order for a forum
state to apply its own law it must have a substantial connection
with the parties or the transaction other than the fact that it is
the forum, 14 Shutts did not offer much more direction about
choice of law in class actions. 15
14. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 820-21 (1985).
15. Professor Richard Nagareda reads more into the Shutts decision and
suggests that the Supreme Court's concern with "bootstrapping" -- using the
existence of a nationwide class "as an added weight in the scale when
considering the permissible constitutional limits on choice of substantive" law
-- has broader repercussions. He argues that a fundamental principle of
Shutts -- even outside its constitutional context -- is that "choice of law in the
absence of bootstrapping results in the same choice being made for purposes
of a class action as would be made in an individual action brought in the
forum state." See Richard Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of Law After
the Class Action Fairness Act, 74 UMKC L. REV. 661, 665-66 (2006). That
broad reading of Shutts is criticized by Professor Stephen B. Burbank in
Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1945 (2006) ("The notion, for instance, that the
Court in Shutts was doing anything other than commenting on the reasoning
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Perhaps the most egregious example of the kind of forum-
shopping I have alluded to is illustrated by an unreported
Oklahoma case, Grider v. Compaq Computer Corp.' 6 In Grider,
the Oklahoma courts used their choice of law interpretation of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine that the
warranty and consumer laws of Texas, which was the principal
place of business of the defendant, should be applied to an entire
nationwide class of consumers complaining about alleged defects
in floppy disk controllers. The Oklahoma court certified the class
even after the Supreme Court of Texas, in an earlier case
involving the same allegations but a different named plaintiff,
held that a nationwide class was inappropriate and that Texas law
could not govern the claims of all class members.' 7
Another example of "forum-shopping" for both a pro-
certification attitude and favorable choice of law is a recent Illinois
case in which a number of conflict of laws professors, including
myself, had a role. The case is Barbara's Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp.18
Professors Peter Hay and John Cross filed an amicus brief on
behalf of themselves in the intermediate appellate court, and then
Professor Hay was joined by Professors Gene Scoles and Russell
Weintraub in an amicus brief on their behalf in the Illinois
Supreme Court. I was asked by defendant's counsel to respond to
the amicus brief in the intermediate Illinois court, and Professors
Tobias Wolff and I were retained by the Chamber of Commerce to
file such a brief. The case was a nationwide class brought in
Illinois state court against a California manufacturer that had
allegedly engaged in unfair business practices to conceal that its
microprocessors did not perform as represented. The trial court
certified a class on behalf of Illinois consumers, but not a
nationwide class, under Illinois law. On appeal, the intermediate
of the Kansas court -- that what the Kansas court did there would have
violated due process if the law selected to facilitate class treatment had been
that of Oklahoma (Phillips's principal place of business) -- seems to me far-
fetched.")
16. No. 03-0969 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Oct. 26, 2004) (order declaring choice of
law), aff d, No. 102, 693 (Okla. Civ. App., Oct. 13, 2006), cert. denied, No. 102,
693 (Okla. Mar. 26, 2007). Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Compaq Computer Corp. v. Grider, 128 S.Ct. 378 (2007).
17. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 681 (Tex. 2004).
I filed an expert report on choice of law in the trial court in this case.
18. Barbara's Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 879 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. 2007).
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court applied the Restatement (Second) and determined that the
law of California-the state where defendant had its principal
place of business-could apply to all members of the class. The
court therefore held that it could certify a nationwide class of
consumers under California law, finding that California as the
principal place of business of the defendant had the most
significant relationship to the case. The effect was that the
intermediate Illinois court applied the California consumer fraud
statute to a nationwide class without any signal from the
California legislature, or the judiciary, that its statute had such
an "extraterritorial" reach. The language of the intermediate
appellate court's opinion stressed the need to find application of a
single law in order to facilitate a single aggregate action, thus
suggesting that "aggregation" was a factor that should tilt towards
finding a single applicable law. The case was appealed to the
Illinois Supreme Court, which reversed the intermediate court.
The Illinois Supreme Court criticized the intermediate court for
its orientation to "one forum with one result," stating that this
view "completely ignores the distinct interests of the differing
states embodied in our federalist system and constitutional
precedent." Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court observed
that the needs of the interstate system and harmonious relations
among states are not furthered by "one forum with one result" and
pointed out that the application of California law or Illinois law to
a citizen of Washington state who purchased his computer in
Washington "does nothing to improve the harmonious relations
between the states." Moreover, the scope of the California
consumer protection statute was more appropriately determined
by California, which had a similar case pending in its state courts.
B. A SPECIAL CHOICE OF LAW RULE FOR AGGREGATE LITIGATION?
As those familiar with choice of law are all aware, and the
survey of Professor Symeon Symeonides reminds every year,' 9
there continue to be different approaches to choice of law in the
various states. However, most states-whether they do so under
the rubric of "interest analysis" or the Restatement (Second)-now
19. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 2007: Twenty-First Annual Survey, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (2008).
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look to the policies of the competing laws as applied to the
particular facts to determine which law ultimately should prevail.
And those principles, at least in an individual action, often point
to the law of plaintiffs domicile in a consumer fraud or breach of
warranty case-typical causes of action in a small-claim,
nationwide class suit. 20 And in a nationwide class action, that
will mean the application of multiple laws.2 1
One question courts face when confronting a choice of law
issue in a class action case is whether aggregation itself justifies
development of a specifically designed choice of law rule that
might make class certification easier. Shutts hinted that it did
not, but that was a situation where the law urged upon the court
lacked constitutional justification altogether. Most state courts-
at least the highest courts of the state-have refused to alter
choice of law rules to favor or disfavor certification of a class. 22
20. See, e.g., Dassault Falcon Jet Corp. v. Oberflex, Inc., 909 F. Supp.
345, 353 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (noting that, in dispute over warranties covering
goods, the place where the goods were used and where the injury was
suffered is the state with the "most significant contacts"); In re Estate of
Rhymer, 969 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. App. 1998) (applying California rather
than Texas solicitation statute to determine whether California resident had
right to rescind contract because home solicitation laws are designed to
protect residents who are solicited in their states).
21. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 458 (E.D. La.
2006) (holding that law of each proposed class member's home state applies
to product liability claims); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 260,
277-78 (D. Mass. 2004) (determining that, in class action brought by indirect
purchasers against defendant pharmaceutical company, state law claims
were governed by law of state where consumers resided); Lyon v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 194 F.R.D. 206, 214 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding that, in class action for
consumer fraud, the applicable law is that of the state where each purchaser
resides)..
22. See, e.g., Barbara's Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 879 N.E.2d 910, 922 (Ill.
2007) (rejecting an intermediate appellate court's view that a class action
mandated "one forum with one result" and applying the general Illinois
choice of law rule leading to the law of the state where each plaintiff
purchased the product); Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 696-97
(Tex. 2002) (applying its normal conflicts rule -- the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts -- to class members' claims and noting that the defendant's
''presence in Texas [was] but one fact to be considered in determining the
applicable law and does not, by itself, dictate that Texas law will govern the
non-contract claims of class members in other states"). But see Ferrell v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 188 P.3d 1156, 1172-73 (N.M. 2008) (reversing intermediate
appellate court's decertification of a class of insurance policy holders from
thirteen states where intermediate court held that the applicable law was
2009]
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They apply the choice of law rules as they would in an individual
action and let the chips fall where they may.
I believe that this approach is the appropriate one in which to
view choice of law in the context of class actions. Class action
rules were not designed to change the substantive rights of the
parties. The traditional justification for aggregation has been that
the parties have a coherence of rights, and it is the existence of
that coherence that makes the class suit appropriate in the first
place. Because it is the pre-existence of these rights that is the
first step in creating the class, to use the class action itself as a
justification for altering choice of law rules is to put the cart before
the horse. 23
Others have disagreed, some because they see the class action
as something quite different than the aggregation of a large
number of individual claimants. For example, Professor David
Shapiro views the class action as an "entity," in which individual
interests are subordinated as a means to pursue collective action
on behalf of the entity.2 4 Although Professor Shapiro does not
directly address the choice of law point, he might have some
sympathy with Professor Edward Cooper, who, in his contribution
to this panel, 25 tentatively suggests that the benefits of efficiency
might be sufficient to "sacrifice" rights that parties might
otherwise have in an individual action and alter choice of law in
order to accommodate aggregation. 26 However, Professor Cooper
misses the mark when he takes aim at choice of law. An entity
that of the states where each policy holder resided and thus a class action
would be unmanageable; the New Mexico Supreme Court opined in dicta that
"for the benefit of our class action jurisprudence" if New Mexican courts were
to follow their usual choice of law rule - the Restatement (First) - the result
usually would lead to application of the law of different states, making class
actions unlikely, and therefore New Mexico would adopt the approach of
Restatement (Second) for "multi-state contract class actions").
23. My view is shared by others. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank,
Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924 (2006); Richard A Nagareda, Bootstrapping in
Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 74 UMKC L. REV. 661
(2006).
24. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 924-25 (1998) (considering the "small claim"
class action the strongest case for the "entity" model).
25. See Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Choice of Law, 14 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 12 (forthcoming 2009).
26. Id. at 19-21.
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model of group litigation whereby individual interests are
subordinated as a means to pursue collective action for the entity
may make sense in an overall legislative scheme where specific
tradeoffs and reassessments of regulatory rules are part of any
reconceptualized regime. 27  In such situations, a federal
substantive law solution might also be possible. But using
aggregation to alter choice of law usually has but one purpose and
that is to find a single law such that a class action can be certified.
It ignores the question of what rights the parties have in the first
place and it undermines the underlying structure of federalism in
the United States where the individual states set the appropriate
standards of responsibility and compensation in a particular area.
The laws in the different states reflect different values, and choice
of law offers a method for accommodating these differences when
interstate behavior brings those competing rules into conflict. 28
Finally, it is universally acknowledged that certification of a class
is often the catalyst for settlement. The manipulation of choice of
law in the service of certification does, of course, increase
efficiency to the extent that settlements are encouraged. But the
underlying question remains whether the parties really have
meritorious claims under the applicable law or whether
certification (or possible certification) of a nationwide class with
its enormous liability risks forces defendants into settlements of
questionable claims. 29 And it was concerns such as these that
motivated the CAFA in the first place.
Most courts, including the highest state courts, have
refused to alter choice of law in order to facilitate aggregation, 30
27. See Linda Silberman, The Vicissitudes of the American Class Action --
With a Comparative Eye, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201, 211 (1999).
28. Harold P. Southerland, Sovereignty, Value Judgments, and Choice of
Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 451, 455, 482 (2000).
29. See the comments of Judge Richard Posner in In re Rhone Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995): "[Certification of a class action
forces] defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury
trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have
no legal liability .... [Defendants] may not wish to roll these dice. That is
putting it mildly. They will be under intense pressure to settle." For further
discussion about class settlement pressure, see Richard A. Nagareda,
Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide
Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1921 (2006).
30. See cases cited supra note 22.
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but there are some counter-examples. In In re Simon II,31 Judge
Jack Weinstein applied a single law to a nationwide class action in
order to avoid manageability problems arising from the
application of multiple laws; however, he was reversed on other
grounds. 32  The American Law Institute's 1993 Complex
Litigation Project recommended that choice of law rules identify, if
possible, a single state law to govern in "complex litigation,"33 but
that ALI effort was directed as much to consolidated and
transferred litigation and a change of the rule in Van Dusen v.
Barrack34 that the transferee forum must apply the choice of law
rules of the transferor forum. Moreover, although the ALI in that
proposal took the position that choice of law rules should tilt to
favor application of a single law, the proposal (never taken up by
Congress) included various other recommendations consistent
with modern choice of law analysis as well as related provisions
that would assist in aggregating litigation even where multiple
laws did apply.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in its recent decision, Ferrell
v. Allstate Insurance Co., expressed frustration that its usual
choice of law approach-that of the First Restatement 35 -often
would lead to application of different laws thereby rendering
"multi-state class actions a virtual nullity. '3 6 Although the court
already had determined that there was no "actual conflict" among
the competing laws3 7 and thus a class of insurance policy-holders
31. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
32. Simon II Litig. v. Philip Morris USA Inc. (In re Simon II Litig.), 407
F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit did not address the choice of law
issue.
33. See AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS & ANALYSIS §6.01(a) (1994).
34. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
35. In tort cases, the First Restatement advocated the lex loci delicti rule
--"[tihe law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained
a legal injury." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 378 (1934).
Because the place of wrong is defined as "the state where the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place," id. at § 377,
the law of the place of purchase would apply to each plaintiffs fraud claim.
36. Ferrell v. Allstate Ins., 188 P.3d 1156, 1171 (N.M. 2008).
37. Id. The court's resolution of this point itself might be subject to
criticism. The court acknowledged the proposition that the party proposing
class certification carries the burden of persuading the district court that
there are no significant variations among the laws of the states connected to
the dispute. But to the extent there is ambiguity with respect to differences
SHOULD CAFA MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
from thirteen states could be certified, the court went further to
address the appropriate choice of law rule "for the benefit of our
class action jurisprudence." The court found the Restatement
(First) "particularly ill-suited for the complexities present in
multi-state class actions" in part because it does not allow a court
"to consider the competing policies of the states implicated by the
suit." Therefore, the court concluded that "the Restatement
(Second) is a more appropriate approach for multi-state contract
class actions." The court did not proceed to identify what law
would apply under the Restatement (Second), but the implication
is that it might well be a "single law" that would apply to the
class. The New Mexico Supreme Court may be correct in its
critique of the First Restatement, but its adoption of the
Restatement (Second) only for multi-state class actions means
that it has altered the rights of the parties merely because there is
an aggregate litigation.
The present American Law Institute Project on Aggregate
Litigation also has a pro-aggregation tilt, but it identifies various
options for dealing with choice of law and has not yet taken a firm
position on the effect that aggregation should have on choice of
law. 38 Section 2.05 provides that the court must "ascertain the
substantive law" to determine whether the class claims involve
common issues, and then authorizes aggregate treatment in
various situations (1) when a single law applies, (2) different laws
apply but are the same in functional content, and (3) different
laws apply and, even though not the same in functional content,
present a limited number of patterns that can be managed by
various trial procedures. But Comment a to 2.05 states that this
section "leav[es] the decision whether to innovate in the area of
choice of law principles to the institutions with the authority to set
those principles themselves." 39  And there is an affirmative
among the state laws, the New Mexico Supreme Court assigns the burden to
the party opposing certification and requires that the party opposing
certification "show that the laws of the relevant states actually conflict
through clearly established, plainly contradictory law." Id. at 1169 .
Notwithstanding the court's protestations to the contrary, this approach also
appears tilted to favor certification of a class.
38. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §
2.05 (Council Draft No. 2, Nov. 18, 2008).
39. Id. § 2.05 cmt. a.
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suggestion that "appropriate institutions" might want to develop
choice of law principles to determine situations where a court may
apply the single law such as the principal place of business of the
defendant to a group of claims held by persons located in multiple
states. That particular proposal seems inconsistent with specific
concerns behind CAFA. Identifying certain class action abuses in
state courts, the Senate Report on CAFA noted the "trend toward
'nationwide' class actions, which invite one state court to dictate to
49 others what their laws should be on a particular issue, thereby
undermining basic federalism principles. '40
C. CHOICE OF LAW, KLAXON, AND CAFA
State cases such as Grider and Intel offer some context for
thinking about what the choice of law regime should be for class
actions brought into federal court under CAFA. Must a federal
court continue to abide by Klaxon and apply the choice of law
rules adopted by the state-even if those choice of law approaches
have the kind of parochial bent that led Congress to enact CAFA
in order to move these cases into federal court?
Among conflict of laws cognoscenti, there has always been
some general anti-Klaxon sentiment. One argument against
Klaxon-even in its most traditional application-is that a federal
choice of law rule is an appropriate way to mediate among
competing substantive state laws vying for application in an
interstate case. Indeed, some have argued for a federal common
law rule that would be the complete reverse of Klaxon-that is,
using a federal choice of law rule where a case was brought in
state or federal court. Although the argument has not been
advanced recently, it has a certain appeal in the context of
nationwide class actions because it would reduce forum-shopping
by plaintiffs among state courts as they seek a forum with
favorable choice of law rules pointing to application of a single law
and facilitating certification of a nationwide class. This would
mean that in a case like Grider or Intel there would be a "federal
choice" rule for nationwide class actions-even when brought in
state court-that could alleviate any "bias" or parochialism in
40. S. REP. 109-14, at 24 (2005).
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state choice of law rules.
But a more limited and less controversial proposal that does
not carry quite the same usurpation of state choice of law as the
previous suggestion would be to adopt a federal choice of law rule
for those class actions that have been brought in or removed to
federal court under CAFA. If one views CAFA as designating
specific types of class actions appropriate for "national
treatment"-that is, in need of federal jurisdiction to ensure
neutral and non-parochial assessments with respect to class
viability-it follows that such cases are also deserving of
independent "federal" choice of law rules. Indeed, if state choice of
law principles reflect the very parochialism that CAFA was
attempting to correct, an anti-Klaxon rule would seem particularly
appropriate here. And because cases falling within CAFA will
usually end up in federal rather than state court, the "inequality"
that a federal choice of law rule might create with respect to a
similar action in state court is unlikely to occur in this context.
Late in the hearings and debate on CAFA, a number of
proposals were made to address the choice of law question. 41
Professors Arthur Miller and Samuel Issacharoff consulted on a
proposal to require federal courts to apply the law of the state
where the principal class action defendant resides. 42 They argued
that a federal choice of law rule was appropriate as part of CAFA
and urged Congress to include as part of CAFA a federal-choice
rule that would ultimately point to the law of the principal place
of business of the defendant. But the objective of that proposal-
to identify a single law in order to make class certification easier-
moves in a direction that completely undermines the objectives of
CAFA itself. One of those objectives was to prevent one state from
issuing "nationwide rulings that actually contradict the laws of
41. See David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some
Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1247, 1308-10 (2007).
42. See Legal Experts Enter Class Action Debate, Meet with Senate Staff
To Discuss Bill, 72 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2446 (Feb. 3, 2004). Professor Issacharoff
has pressed this argument in a couple of recent articles. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law
After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006); Samuel
Issacharoff, Getting Beyond Kansas, 74 UMKC L. REV. 613 (2006).
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other states"43 and to eliminate the false federalism by which one
court applies the law of a "single state to transactions that
occurred in all 50 states"-thereby overriding "whatever policy
determinations another state's legislature or courts may have
made . . . .. 44 A choice of law rule that points to the law of
defendant's principal place of business for all transactions is
exactly the kind of rule that CAFA was designed to prevent.
Professor Issacharoff has argued in two recent articles that
because nationwide class actions are the result of a national
market for undifferentiated goods that ultimately cause national
harm, a federal choice of law rule is appropriate and that rule
should invoke the law of the defendant's principal place of
business. 45 But that rule has little to do with federalism values
and much to do with facilitating aggregation. And the existence of
a national market actually undercuts Issacharoffs position.
Having a single uniform law of products liability or consumer
fraud to apply to goods in the national market does make sense,
but only if such a rule is developed as a matter of consensus by the
national government as national law. If such a federal
substantive law were passed, it would reflect the interests of
consumers and businesses because it would have been debated in
Congress-the national forum-and would represent a national
consensus. But the idea of choosing the law of "one state" to
represent the national consensus, when the states disagree both
about what the "substance" of rules relating to consumer fraud or
breach of warranty should be and about which state's law should
be chosen, is a serious breach of federalism.
That is not to say that a federal or national choice of law rule
could not be the subject of consensus that emerged in a serious
debate in Congress. Indeed, a federal choice rule developed in a
national forum could be an important mechanism for furthering
the objectives of CAFA, and it is unfortunate that choice of law did
not become a piece of the legislation. Late floor amendments
dealing tangentially with choice of law were introduced, but they
were merely attempts to inject pro-aggregation elements into
43. S. REP. 109-14, at 24 (2005).
44. Id. at 25.
45. See Issacharoff, supra note 2.
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legislation targeted in exactly the opposite direction. 46 Whether
consensus of any kind on choice of law could emerge in a
thoughtful and serious debate is unclear, but it is almost certain
that the law of a "single" state, such as the principal place of
business, would not be the outcome.
Choice of law rules were debated in Congress in connection
with the Multiparty, Multi-forum Trial Jurisdiction Act, 4 7 but the
statute was passed only after various provisions on choice of law
(that changed over the period of years that earlier iterations of the
bill languished in Congress) were eliminated. One analogy that
comes to mind in considering the impact of a "national market" on
choice of law is the European initiative taken in the Rome I and
Rome II Regulations 48 on choice of law that create "national choice
of law rules" for the European market. Admittedly, those rules-
that generally point to the law of the habitual residence of the
plaintiff or consumer-are developed in the context of individual
litigation. But they underscore the point that one state's
legislature or one state's development of a common law rule
should not dictate the substance of the applicable standard in a
national market when multiple states, in which plaintiffs reside,
have reached different solutions with respect to issues of loss-
allocation. Moreover, CAFA was passed in reaction to concerns
about parochialism by some states purporting to decide law for the
rest of the country. A federal choice of law rule that is
manipulated to impose a single state's law without consideration
of other states' interests turns that legislation on its head.
But what about a different and more nuanced federal choice of
law rule developed by the federal courts for CAFA cases? So far
the federal courts hearing CAFA cases have not considered a
46. See 151 CONG. REC. S1167 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Bingaman) (discussing his original CAFA amendment affirming a judge's
authority to select the law of one state to govern a nationwide class, along
with Senator Feinstein's revised amendment to prevent the application of
multiple state laws from thwarting class certification).
47. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1369
(2006).
48. Regulation 864/2007, On the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual
Obligations (Rome II), recital 39, 2007 O.J. (L 199); Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (Rome I), art. 9, 2005/0261/COD (Mar. 31, 2008)
(adopted June 6, 2008).
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federal choice of law rule and have mechanically cited Klaxon
without analyzing whether the rule should extend to national
market class actions.4 9 In one case, Thompson v. Jiffy Lube
International, Inc.,50 plaintiffs did argue that a single state's law
should apply to all class members and relied upon CAFA as
support for this view, arguing that "Congress passed CAFA in
order to create efficiencies in the judicial system." The Kansas
district court made short shrift of this argument, pointing out that
"[w]hatever the policy merits of such an approach, the argument
lacks any support whatsoever in the language of the Act.
Nowhere does the Act purport to dictate the substantive law to be
applied to claims of purported class members. '51
Ideally, Congress-if it ever returns to CAFA in order to
remedy some of its problems-could direct the federal courts to
apply "federal choice of law principles" in these cases. And
Congress might well take such action if states enact or develop
choice of law principles that favor aggregation or further local
interests at the expense of national ones. One would think that
Congress would not want CAFA undermined by state choice of law
rules imposed upon federal class actions, and certainly a federal
court adjudicating a national class action should not have to bow
to any such state parochialism. In the absence of congressional
action, however, the federal courts have the power to reject Klaxon
for cases brought under CAFA and might well be advised to do so.
There is a body of "federal choice of law" to apply -- federal choice
of law has generally embraced some version of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws with an emphasis on "contacts" and
"interests"52-and it is unlikely to yield the kind of choice of law
parochialism seen in a number of states. Moreover, a firm
49. See, e.g., Green v. Charter One Bank, N.A., No. 08C1684, 2009 WL
483892, at *4 n.6 (N.D. Il. Feb. 25, 2009); Shaw v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 570 F.
Supp. 2d 78, 86 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Grand Theft Auto Video Game Consumer
Litig., 251 F.R.D. 139, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Thompson v. Jiffy Lube Int'l,
Inc., 250 F.R.D. 607, 625 (D. Kan. 2008); In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab.
Litig. 245 F.R.D. 279, 295 n. 90 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
50. 250 F.R.D. 607 (D. Kan. 2008).
51. Id. at 628.
52. See, e.g., Eli Lilly Do Brasil, Ltda. v. Fed. Express Corp., 502 F.3d 78,
81 (2d Cir. 2007) ("In general, '[t]he federal common law choice-of-law rule is
to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the
litigation."').
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"reversal" of Klaxon in CAFA cases will help develop appropriate
choice of law rules for these cases and is a much clearer and
cleaner approach to the problem than proposals such as those of
Professors Richard Nagareda 53 and Stephen Burbank, 54 who
suggest that the federal courts have the power to reject state
choice of law rules when particular rules are found to be biased in
favor of aggregate litigation.
Without direction from Congress, however, it may be that the
federal courts will continue to apply Klaxon to CAFA cases as the
early decisions under the Act indicate. But if the federal courts
can begin to view the "choice of law issue" separately from the
"certification" decision, perhaps both choice of law and aggregate
litigation can be served. That is, application of different laws to
class and other kinds of aggregate litigation should not necessarily
be dispositive of the certification issue. It may be possible in some
cases to use subclasses and accommodate variations in state
laws.55 Applicable state laws may be grouped into manageable
patterns such that complications from choice of law differences
can be obviated. 56 In other cases variations in state law may be
too complex, and certification should be refused. But courts
should focus their attention on these myriad factors that
determine whether a class should be certified, including how a
case might be managed if different laws are to be applied. That
would leave choice of law to be decided in the context of the
53. Nagareda, supra note 29, at 1921.
54. Burbank, supra, note 15, at 1950-51.
55. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 230
F.R.D. 61 (D. Mass. 2005) (applying, in class action brought by third-party
payors against drug manufacturers for establishing an inflated wholesale
price, the laws of the home states of the consumers pursuant to the
Restatement (Second) but nonetheless certifying a class of physician-
administered drugs while denying a class of self-administered drugs and
drugs distributed through a specialty pharmacy).
56. Elizabeth Cabraser has described a nationwide consumer class action
of homeowners claiming that hardboard siding used in homes was defective.
After the class was certified, see Ex Parte Masonite, 681 So.2d 1068 (Ala.
1995), there was an initial trial phase where the jury returned a special
verdict on the "defectiveness" of the product in the form of answers to a series
of jury interrogatories, each corresponding to the controlling definition of
"defect" in the various states. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Just Choose: The
Jurisprudential Necessity To Select a Single Governing Law for Mass Claims
Arising from Nationally Marketed Consumer Goods and Services, 14 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 29 (forthcoming 2009).
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genuine federalism concerns that are its province.
